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Abstract 
 
We model the effects of consumption-type taxes which differ according to the base 
and location of the tax. Our model incorporates a multinational producing and selling in 
two countries with three sources of rent, each in a different location: a fixed basic 
production factor (located with initial production), mobile managerial skill, and a fixed final 
production factor (located with consumption). In the general case, we show that for 
national governments, there are tradeoffs in choosing between alternative taxes. In 
particular, a cash-flow tax on a source basis creates welfare-impairing distortions to 
production and consumption, but is partially incident on the owners of domestic 
production who may be non-resident. By contrast, a destination-based cash-flow tax does 
not distort behavior, but is incident only on domestic residents. In the alternative case with 
the returns to the fixed factors accruing to domestic residents, the only distortion from the 
source-based tax is through the allocation of the mobile managerial skill. In this case, the 
source-based tax is also incident only on domestic residents, and is dominated by an 
equivalent tax on a destination basis. 
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1. Introduction  
It is generally understood that the distortionary effects of capital income taxation 
are magnified in open economies. For example, the standard theoretical model suggests 
that the optimal effective marginal tax rate of a source-based capital income tax in a small 
open economy is zero (see Gordon, 1986). Raising this tax rate increases the required pre-
tax rate of return in that location; this reduces the quantity of capital located there, which 
in turn creates an excess burden which could be avoided by taxing immobile factors 
directly. 
One alternative to income taxation is consumption-type taxation. This paper 
investigates the effects of different types of consumption-type taxation on factor allocation, 
production and consumption in a two-country framework. Our particular interest is in 
three versions of the business cash-flow tax levied on business profit.1 These differ in how 
the profit is allocated across the two countries. We analyze the case where aggregate profit 
is allocated by an apportionment factor based on the location of sales; a “destination” tax 
akin to VAT where exports are tax exempt, but imports are taxed; and a conventional 
source-based tax. We explore and compare the efficiency properties of each of these forms 
of taxation. We show that there are many potential distortions even when capital income is 
excluded from the tax base, so that the tax is based only on profit or economic rent. We also 
examine a game played between the two countries to consider what the non-cooperative 
outcome would be if the two countries chose their tax systems independently. In particular, 
starting from the most common form of taxation, the source-based tax, we analyze whether 
                                                 
1
 These three can be thought of, for example, as variants of the R-based tax of Meade et al. (1978), although since 
we do not include debt in our model , this would be equivalent to the R+F based tax.  
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countries have an incentive to switch at least part of their tax system to one of the other 
forms.  
We model a representative multinational company which takes all prices as given, 
and which is owned equally by two representative consumers, one in each country. The 
company has a production plant in each country that supplies either or both consumers. 
The final good differs between countries depending on local conditions – for example, a car 
must be prepared as right- or left-hand drive. The company exports an intermediate 
product between the two countries, and completes the final product in the country in 
which it is sold and consumed.  
The company generates profit in three ways. First, it has the use of a fixed factor in 
each production location of the intermediate good, which implies that there are decreasing 
returns to scale in the other two factors, capital and managerial skill. The existence of the 
fixed factor generates profit in the country of production. This factor can be thought of, for 
example, as a local supply network that has been built up in each country, and which is 
available to the multinational to support production. Second, we also assume that there is a 
fixed factor in process of adjusting the intermediate good for the local market, which 
generates profit in the country of consumption. Third, the company owns a fixed supply of 
managerial skill, which it can move freely between the two countries. The profit generated 
from access to managerial skill is therefore mobile between the two countries.  
Within this framework, even taxes on business profits can affect economic behavior. 
For example, consider the effects of a source-based cash-flow tax applied to the company in 
each country, where the home country has a higher tax rate. Other things being equal, and 
even in the absence of manipulating the transfer price of the intermediate good for tax 
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reasons, the company would prefer to shift production of the intermediate good to the 
lower-taxed country, and export the intermediate good back to the home country to serve 
the domestic market. In addition, the company will have an incentive to inflate the transfer 
price at which the intermediate good is sold, since this will raise taxable profit in the 
foreign country and reduce it in the home country. This in turn creates a further incentive 
to shift production to the foreign country. So even under a cash-flow tax, the company will 
have an incentive to shift production to the foreign country, where the tax rate is lower.2 
By contrast, a destination-based tax implemented in both countries along the lines 
of a VAT (but with labor costs deductible) would be efficient, equivalent to a lump-sum tax. 
This stems from the assumption that the representative consumer is immobile. A tax based 
solely on the revenue generated in each market cannot be avoided by switching factors of 
production (and trade flows) between countries.  
A source-based cash-flow tax does have an attractive property, even though it 
causes distortions, including to the location of production. The incidence of such a tax falls 
to some extent on the owners of the company. As long as the company is at least partly 
owned by non-residents, then the source-based tax is partly incident on those non-
residents. In a non-cooperative setting, then, there is generally a trade-off for governments 
in setting a source-based tax rate. On the one hand, a higher tax rate induces a deadweight 
cost due to distortions induced by a switch of production between countries; on the other 
hand the country benefits since part of the incidence of the tax falls on non-residents. 
                                                 
2
 Note that this depends on production taking place in both countries. If the company chooses to produce in only one 
country, then its discrete choice of which country to choose will depend on the tax rate. Bond and Devereux (2002) 
compare the properties of source- and destination-based taxes in this framework. 
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Beginning with the standard case in practice of only a source-based tax in each 
country, we ask whether the home government has an incentive to switch part of its tax 
base away from the source base to either a destination base or a sales tax on the good 
produced by the multinational. In the general case, it is not possible to identify whether the 
government should do this or not. The reason is the tradeoff just mentioned between the 
benefit of taxing non-residents as against the deadweight loss imposed by the source-based 
tax. 
However, this benefit of the source-based tax is not present in an alternative 
framework which we model. In this framework, the rent earned by the fixed factors 
(associated with initial production and final production) accrue to domestic residents 
rather than to the multinational. This generates a direct benefit to the representative 
residents from attracting each element of production activity, in that the prices of the fixed 
factors are bid up. In this case, the only source of measured company profits (which we 
continue to assume are shared equally between jurisdictions) is the returns to managerial 
skill. In this setting, it is possible to show that a switch to the destination based tax would 
be beneficial.  
This result appears to be at odds with several claims in the literature regarding the 
equivalence of destination and source-based taxes. In the last model, the only remaining 
distortion is the choice of where to locate managerial skill. That implicitly reflects a 
transfer pricing decision, since in our model this factor can be allocated freely, and hence in 
effect the transfer price is zero. If instead, we assumed that the factor was wholly owned in 
one country, and that its transfer to the other country was appropriately priced, then even 
this distortion would disappear, and the source-based tax, like the destination-based tax, 
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would be equivalent to a lump-sum tax. This is implicitly the framework underlying the 
contributions of Auerbach (1997), Bradford (2003) and others, resulting in the claim that 
destination-based and source-based consumption taxes are equivalent.3 We show in this 
paper the nature of the assumptions that need to be made for such an equivalence to hold.  
In that respect, this paper relates closely to the literature investigating the 
comparison between VAT levied on a destination or origin (i.e. source) basis. A 
comprehensive analysis of alternative locations of the VAT base was provided by 
Lockwood (2001), who synthesized a number of earlier contributions. Our model differs 
substantially, focusing particularly on firm-level decisions and several variations in tax 
structure as opposed to modeling the consumption side in more detail. Nevertheless, the 
results are broadly consistent: Lockwood finds that destination and origin bases are only 
equivalent in the presence of perfect competition and factor immobility. This would also be 
true in our model, though as noted above, mobile managerial skill would not overturn this 
result under appropriate transfer pricing. Beyond this, Lockwood (building on Lockwood, 
1993, and Keen and Lahiri, 1998) also finds that the introduction of imperfect competition 
destroys this equivalence. We do not model imperfect competition in this paper.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up the base case 
model, and analyzes the impact of the four taxes (a domestic sales tax on one good only, 
and a cash-flow corporation tax based on formula apportionment, a destination base, and a 
source base) when both countries adopt the same form of taxation. To set the scene, and 
for the purposes of comparison, this section also considers a lump-sum tax, and a domestic 
sales tax on all goods, which also amounts to a lump-sum tax in our model. Given that 
                                                 
3
 See also Avi-Yonah (2000), and Grubert and Newlon (1997). 
 6 
source-based taxes are dominant in practice, Section 3 addresses the question of whether, 
starting from the case in which both countries impose a source-based tax, the home 
country has an incentive to switch part of its tax base to either a destination basis or a sales 
tax on one good only. Section 4 extends the framework of the model by considering the 
case in which the returns to the fixed factors accrue only to domestic residents, and not to 
the company. Section 5 concludes.  
2. Properties of common tax regimes 
There are two countries. Each country has a representative agent with a utility 
function of the form 
(2.1)     (  )      ( )    
    (  )    
   (  )   
where c1 and c2 represent consumption of goods 1 and 2 respectively, g is a local public 
good, and the asterisk denotes the foreign country. To make the model tractable, we 
assume that there are no income effects in the demand for good 1. In general, we allow the 
shape of the utility function for good 1 to differ between the two countries, although we 
also study the symmetric case in which the utility functions are the same. 
In each country there is one unit of an endowment good. Production of one unit of 
good 2 in each country uses one unit of endowment. The production of good 2 is therefore 
characterized by constant returns to scale, and is assumed to be perfectly competitive, so 
that there are no profits. Good 2 can be used as a public good (g) or as consumption (  ), 
with the remainder supplied as capital to the world capital market. Hence, the total world 
supply of capital (K) is 
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(2.2)    (      )  (    
    )       
where k is the amount of capital used in the home country and k* is the amount used 
abroad.  
Good 1 is produced by a single representative multinational, which takes all prices 
as given. It produces the basic good in both countries, and in its production has access to 
two additional factors, both in fixed supply. One factor is a local supply network that has 
been built up in each country, and which is available to the multinational to support 
production. The second is access to managerial skill (m), the overall stock of which is 
assumed to be in fixed supply, M, and which can be used for production in either location. 
Thus, 
(2.3)          
where m is the amount of capital used in the home country and    is the amount used 
abroad. Also, the total amount of capital used by the multinational, K, is shared between the 
two sites of production as shown in (2.2). 
We assume that the basic production function used by the multinational is the same 
in both countries,  (   )  and that there are decreasing returns to scale because of the 
fixed factor representing the local supply network. There are no transportation costs, so 
without taxes the locations of production and consumption are unrelated. Hence  
(2.4)       
   (   )   (     ) 
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where    and   
  are the output from the production processes consumed in the home and 
foreign country respectively. The locations of capital production and capital use are also 
unrelated. 
The final product must be prepared for sale in each country due to local tastes. For 
example, cars must be adjusted to be left-hand or right-hand drive, depending on local law. 
This links consumption of good 1 in each country with the basic output sold in that country, 
according to a common second stage production function,  ( ), 
(2.5)      (  ) ;   
   (  
 )  
where    and   
  are the quantity of sales of the multinational in each country, and  ( ) is 
assumed to be decreasing returns to scale. 
Although we model a representative company, we assume that there are many such 
companies which determine the price in equilibrium. Any single company therefore takes 
the output price as given. Conditional on the consumer price in each country, decreasing 
returns to scale of  ( ) leads to different values associated with x in the two countries. If, for 
example, there is a stronger demand for good-1 consumption in country 1, then this will 
lead to more consumption, and higher consumption rents in that country. 
Ownership of the multinational, and hence profit (), is shared equally between the 
two countries’ representative agents. The profits have three components: returns to the 
fixed factor in basic production, returns to managerial skill, and returns to the fixed factor 
in final production. The effective locations of these components differ. The return to the 
fixed factor in basic production is located in the country hosting that fixed factor;4 the 
                                                 
4
 Here we assume that the fixed factor is owned directly by the multinational. 
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return to managerial skill is mobile, and depends on the location of the managerial skill 
itself; and the return to the fixed factor in final production is located in the country of 
consumption. The differences in location for these components of profits are important in 
modeling the impact of alternative taxes.  
We now consider the effects of using different types of taxes to raise revenue to 
finance public goods. Initially, we consider only cases in which both governments adopt the 
same tax base; in Section 3 we consider the incentives to deviate from a common tax base. 
2.1. Lump sum tax 
To set the stage, consider first the case of lump sum taxes (T and T*) levied on the 
consumer in each country, and equal to government spending, T = g; T* = g*. Individuals 
choose consumption of goods 1 and 2 to maximize utility, U or U*, subject to a budget 
constraint: 
(2.6)               
 
 
  ;    
   
    
   
    
 
 
      
Without income effects and assuming that the price of good 2  1, this implies 
(2.7)    (  )         
  (  
 )    
   
The profit of the multinational is: 
(2.8)           
   
       (  )    
  { (   )   (       )    }   . 
Maximizing profit with respect to k, m, K, and 1x , and yields the following first-order 
conditions for profit maximization of the multinational: 
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(2.9)      (   )    ( 
    )     
(2.10)    (   )    ( 
    ) 
(2.11)    
   (  
 )  
 
  (    )
  
(2.12)      (  )    
   (  
 ) 
Conditions (2.9) and (2.10) call for production efficiency, with the marginal product 
of capital equal across the two countries, and also the marginal product of managerial skill 
equal across the two countries. Condition (2.11) calls for setting marginal revenue equal to 
marginal cost. Condition (2.12) implies that marginal revenues should be independent of 
consumption location.  
Given that production functions are the same in the two countries, then (2.9) and 
(2.10) imply that          and           In turn, this implies that these four 
first-order conditions imply: 
(2.13)     
 (  )    
   (  
 )      (
 
 
 
 
 
). 
The home government chooses the lump sum tax T to maximize utility, U, subject to 
its budget constraint, gT  . The foreign government faces the equivalent problem. This 
yields: 
(2.14)    (  )
   
  
 
   
  
   ( )     
With no income effects in the demand for good 1,      ⁄     
       ⁄  Given the 
household budget constraints (2.6), this implies that      ⁄     
       ⁄  Thus, 
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  ( )     (  )     which implies that the optimal value of the public goods,   ̅      ̅   are 
given by: 
(2.15)     ̅    
  
( );   ̅     
  
( ). 
Note that the consumer budget constraints can be rewritten as 
(2.16)     (  )        
(  (  )    
  (  
 )  
   )
 
   ̅ 
with the equivalent for the foreign country. These two constraints represent only one new 
equation, given Walras’ law. Equation (2.2), combined with (2.4), (2.5), (2.13) and (2.16) 
represent seven equations in seven unknowns, the four consumption levels, the two levels 
of output, and the capital stock, K, that can be solved for their equilibrium values. 
Having summarized the equilibrium conditions when both countries use lump-sum 
taxes, we now consider the effects of using other tax systems. 
2.2. Uniform domestic consumption tax  
 Suppose that the home country imposes a tax at tax-inclusive rate t on 
consumption of goods 1 and 2, and the foreign country imposes a tax of the same form, at 
rate t*. Define p1 and p2 to be the home-country consumer prices, inclusive of tax, of goods 1 
and 2 respectively with the same notation convention abroad. Taxes are therefore  
(2.17)     {         };  
    {  
   
    
   
 } 
As there are no taxes on production, the producer price of the numeraire good 2 remains 
equal to 1 in both countries. This implies that the consumer prices of good 2 become 
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  (   ) and   (    ). With these prices, the conditions for utility maximization 
become: 
(2.18)     (  )  
  
  
 (   )       
  (  
 )  
  
 
  
  (   )  
 , 
and after-tax profits of the multinational are: 
(2.19)      (   )     
 (    )  
    
Combining (2.18) and (2.19) yields the same expression for profits as above, (2.8). 
Thus the conditions for profit-maximization, (2.9)-(2.12), are also the same as in the case of 
the lump-sum tax. Finally, the household budget constraint becomes  
(2.20)     (  )      (   ) (  
(  (  )    
  (  
 )  
   )
 
), 
with the equivalent for the foreign country.  
Since the choice of tax rate t amounts to a lump-sum tax on endowment and profits, 
both of which are unaffected by the tax rate, it amounts to a lump-sum tax on domestic 
residents. As a consequence,     ̅          ̅   the equilibrium is unchanged. 
2.3. Domestic sales tax on good 1 only 
It is useful to consider good 2 to be an untaxed good, such as leisure, so that the 
sales tax will have some distortionary impact, as would be realistic.5 With no tax on good 2 
in either country, individual maximization yields the same expressions as for the lump-sum 
tax, (2.7).  
                                                 
5
 One might also think of good 2 as local production by small producers below a taxpaying threshold. 
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After-tax profits are therefore: 
(2.21)       (   )     (   
 )  
   
     
 (   )   (  )  (   
 )  
  { (   )   (       )    }    
Maximization with respect to k and m will still yield production efficiency, since all the 
terms in k and m are multiplied by (1-t*). However, conditions (2.11) and (2.12) become 
(2.22)  (    )  
   (  
 )  
 
  (    )
 , and  
(2.23)  (   )   
 (  )  (   
 )  
   (  
 ) 
implying that condition (2.13) becomes: 
 (2.24)  (   )   
 (  )  (   
 )  
   (  
 )      (
 
 
 
 
 
). 
The consumer choice of good 1 is therefore distorted in each country. 
The government now faces a more complicated decision since increasing the tax will 
have substitution effects as well as income effects. The government chooses the tax rate t, 
again to maximize U, subject to the consumer’s budget constraint, 
(2.25)            
 
 
   {(   )     (   
 )  
   
   }   
and the government’s budget constraint, 
(2.26)           . 
Substituting (2.25) into the expression for U, and maximizing with respect to t, implies: 
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(2.27)  
  
  
   ( )
  
  
         ( 
    ⁄
    ⁄
) 
where 
(2.28)  
  
  
 
 
 
  
  
   
   
  
 
 
 
  
  
    (  )  
   
  
 
is the change in real income due to an increase in t, resulting from the direct change in 
nominal income through  , plus the change in purchasing power due to price changes.  
To take this further, consider     ⁄ :  
(2.29)  
  
  
       (   )  
   
  
 (    )  
    
 
  
   
   
   
 
  
 
 [ (   )   
 (  )
   
  
 (    )  
   (  
 )
   
 
  
 
  
  
] 
The first line reflects the impact on post-tax profit of an increase in the tax rate holding 
everything else constant, plus the effects through changes in the output prices in the two 
countries, which are not taken into consideration by the multinational, plus the effect on 
post-tax profit through a possible reaction in the foreign tax rate. The second line is equal 
to zero from the multinational’s first-order condition for profit maximization. 
Noting that 
   
  
    (  )
   
  
 and the equivalent for the foreign price, we can combine 
(2.28) and (2.29) to yield an expression for the effect on real income: 
(2.30)  
  
  
  
 
 
{  (  )    
  (  
 )  
   
 
  
 (   )   
  (  )
   
  
 
(    )  
   
  
(  
 )(   
 )
  
}  
For the effect on revenues, we have: 
(2.31)  
  
  
   (  )    [   
  (  )   
 (  )]
   
  
. 
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Comparing these two expressions yields: 
(2.32)  
  
  
  
  
  
    (  )
   
  
 
        
 
 
{  (  )   (   )   
  (  )
   
  
 (    )  
   
  
(  
 )
   
 
  
   
 
(  
 )  
   
 
  
}  
                   
  
  
    (  )
   
  
 
 
 
   
  
 
 
 
   
  
   
where      ⁄  is the sum of the first two components of     ⁄  in the first line of 
expression (2.29) and      ⁄  is the sum of the last two components. There are three 
sources of deviation from equality of |dY/dt| and dT/dt on the right-hand side of this 
expression: 
 The first, [   (  )
   
  
]  represents the first-order deadweight cost from worsening 
the pre-existing tax distortion,    , which is equal to zero for t = 0. This will reduce g. 
 The second and third terms, [ 
 
 
   
  
]  and [ 
 
 
   
  
]  account for tax exporting. The 
second (which will be positive for an increase in t) reflects the fact that only half of 
the reduction in profits from home country taxes shows up in home country income, 
even though all of it shows up in home-country taxes; this will increase g. The third 
term has the opposite sign, reflecting the fact that half of the tax-induced change in 
profits due to foreign country taxes shows up in home country income, even though 
none of it shows up in home country-taxes; this will reduce g, assuming that foreign-
country tax revenues rise. 
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2.4. Business profits tax with apportionment by sales 
Formula apportionment has often been considered as a solution to the difficulty of 
determining the location of the tax base, and has recently been proposed by the European 
Commission as a replacement for existing corporation taxes in Europe. Its properties have 
been analyzed by Gordon and Wilson (1986), who demonstrated that for a standard 
corporate income tax, a three-factor formula based on the location of property, payroll and 
sales could be examined as, in effect, three forms of distortionary taxation. It is clear that a 
formula based on property or payroll would affect location incentives. We therefore focus 
on the case where the apportionment factor is solely the destination of sales – that is, 
where the consumer resides, as proposed by Avi-Yonah and Clausing (2008). We further 
consider the case in which the tax base itself is a business cash-flow tax.6  
We assume here that the apportionment factor is based on the location of the 
consumption of good 1 only, rather than on goods 1 and 2. This would follow naturally if 
the multinational does not also produce good 2, or if good 2 represents leisure. This 
assumption implies that sales of good 2 in either country have no impact on the firm’s tax 
payments.7 Consequently, the equilibrium competitive price for good 2 will still be 1, and 
the utility maximization conditions for the lump-sum tax in (2.7) still hold. Also, the 
condition for pre-tax profits given in (2.8) holds. Post-tax profits are: 
                                                 
6
 We abstract from issues concerning debt and the treatment of interest, by implicitly assuming the multinational is 
equity financed. 
7
 If sales of good 2 were included in the apportionment formula, for example if the multinational were an integrated 
producer of goods 1 and 2, this would lead to an additional distortion. The firm would be encouraged to shift sales 
of low-margin products, in this model good 2, from the high-tax country to the low-tax country, to reduce the 
share of its overall sales in the high-tax country. In a more general model with sales of intermediate 
production inputs (absent from our model because the two stages of good-1 production occur within the 
same firm), there would be a second additional distortion, through the implicit taxation of intermediate sales 
along the lines of the implicit taxation of final goods sales described in expression (2.34). See Auerbach (2011) 
for further discussion of these distortions. 
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(2.33)              (   ) ;    
where    
   (  )
   (  )   
  (  
 )
 
    
       
   
 . 
Using (2.8) and (2.33), we can derive the firm’s optimal conditions with respect to k, 
m, K, and x1. For the condition with respect to k, we have: 
(2.34)           (   )  
 (    ) 
       
   
    
   (  
 )   (   )    ( 
    )    
Hence, the term  *11 ff   must equal 0 and (2.9) still holds; likewise, so does condition 
(2.10), so there is still production efficiency. 
The remaining two conditions, with respect to K and c1, imply  
(2.35)  [  
 (    ) 
(   )     (    )  
   
 ]   
   (  
 )  
 
  (
 
 
 
 
 
)
 
where we have here used the conditions for production efficiency. Expression (2.35) 
indicates that there will be an effective tax or a subsidy on consumption according to 
whether the home tax rate is higher or lower than the tax rate abroad. So if *tt  , for 
example, sales are discouraged at home and encouraged abroad by the incentive to shift the 
location of profits for tax purposes. 
As to the choice of public goods, we again have      ( 
    ⁄
    ⁄
), with the 
numerator again reflecting the changes in    and     Following the same approach as 
above, and again using the production efficiency conditions then, after some algebra, it is 
possible to show that 
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 }] 
where  is pre-tax profits, and the envelope theorem implies that only terms in     and    
  
enter this expression from changing either pre-tax profit or the effective tax rate. Also, we 
have: 
(2.37)  
  
  
      
  
  
   
  
  
 
Comparing these two expressions yields: 
(2.38)   
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]       
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[(     (   )  )
  
  
  (    )
  
  
] 
As in the case of the domestic sales tax on good 1 only, there is a deadweight loss 
term and fiscal externality terms in addition to dT/dt. In summary, although a cash-flow tax 
in a domestic context is equivalent to a non-distortionary lump-sum tax, apportioning a 
cash-flow tax internationally based on the destination of sales will generally distort 
consumption in both countries, although it will not distort production in this particular set-
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up with intermediate inputs not involved in the tax computation. It thus has impacts 
similar to sales taxes in our model. Since sales taxes are more straightforward to analyze, 
we focus on those in Section 3 of the paper. 
2.5. Destination-based cash-flow tax 
We now consider a tax with the same cash-flow base, but with the tax base 
determined directly by the destination of sales using border adjustments, as under a VAT. 
Consider first the tax treatment of sector 2. In the absence of any trade in good 2, 
profits are zero and tax from this sector is zero. But with trade then an import of good 2 
would be subject to the import tax at rate t or t*. The price of the domestically produced 
good 2 must be the same as for imported goods. Further, if the sector is a net exporter, then 
its tax will be negative. The tax liability in sector 2 and on imports together is: 
(2.39)      {  (      )   }  
where w is the producer price of the endowment. If (      )    then the home 
country exports good 2 (or capital) and       If (      )    then      is a tax on 
imports. The opposite holds for the foreign country. If (      )   , the post-tax zero-
profits condition is: 
(2.40)     (   ){  (      )   }  (   
 )  
 (        )    
which is solved by        (   ) and   
    (    ). That is, the prices of good 2 
and the endowment good are grossed up by (   ) in the home country and (    ) in the 
foreign country. The goods exported to the foreign country are taxed at rate   , and so are 
the same price as domestically produced goods in that country. Condition (2.18) therefore 
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holds, as for the uniform domestic consumption tax. If         , post-tax profit is 
zero, but the price of good 2 must reflect the import tax and so is again grossed up. 
After tax profits in sector 1 are: 
(2.41)   (   ){        }  (   
 ){  
   
    
 (   )}    (  )    
  (  
 )  
    
This is identical to the expression for lump-sum taxes. Since the tax is all spent on g, all the 
results for lump-sum taxes continue to hold, though with all prices (including wages and 
those for government purchases) grossed up by     in the home country and      in the 
foreign country. 
The household budget constraint is: 
(2.42)                (  
  (  )    
  (  
 )  
   
 
) 
    (  )        (   ) (
  (  )    
  (  
 )  
   
 
) 
with an equivalent condition for the foreign country. 
This expression makes it clear that the destination-based tax is equivalent to a tax 
on the pure profits received by domestic residents. As this is a lump-sum tax on domestic 
residents, it has no impact on government spending, i.e.,     ̅          ̅   In summary, 
a destination-based cash-flow tax acts as a lump-sum tax. 
This result differs from the analysis of a destination-based VAT in Keen and Lahiri 
(1998) and Lockwood (2001). Keen and Lahiri assume that the tax is levied only on the 
imperfectly competitive sector; like a sales tax only on good 1 (or the sales-apportioned 
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cash-flow tax), this would clearly would distort consumption choices in our model.8 
Lockwood assumes that consumers are internationally mobile, which would introduce a 
new, and distorted, margin of consumer choice under the destination-based tax. 
2.6. Source-based cash-flow tax 
We now consider a third version of the cash-flow tax, in this case one allocated using 
the source principle. 
For this tax, there would be no taxes in the competitive sector 2, so p2 = 1. Hence, the 
prices of good 1 in the two countries are governed by expression (2.7). We assume that the 
final level of production, turning x into the final good 1, takes place in the country of 
consumption.9 Define e to be exports of the unfinished good 1 (i.e. x) from the home 
country plant to the foreign country plant at price q and e* to be exports of good 1 from the 
foreign country plant to the home country plant at price   . Then profit earned by the home 
country plant is    (   ){   ( (   )     
 )           } and that earned by 
the foreign plant is:   
  (    ){  
  ( (     )      )             }. Total profit 
after tax is: 
(2.43)    (      )(   )  (  
   
    )(    )  (       )(    )  
Conditional on production and consumption in the two countries, (    ) is 
determined, but not the individual gross exports. This arises because there are no 
                                                 
8
 Note that, if one thinks of good 2 as leisure, then the lack of distortion in our model can also be thought of a 
relating to the fact that our destination-based cash-flow tax excludes labor from the tax base, unlike a standard VAT.  
With a labor-leisure trade-off, of course, a uniform VAT on market consumption expenditures would distort labor 
supply. 
9
 In addition to customization for local markets, one can think of this final production stage as including advertising, 
distribution, and other activities that take place in the proximity of consumption. 
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transportation costs, which implies that the firm can choose where to produce for each 
market. With production and consumption in each country given, unit increases in both e 
and    lead to a net increase in after-tax profits of (    )(    ).  
The prices q and    are internal transfer prices of the multinational company. Since 
there are no observable arms’ length prices, it may be open to the company to manipulate 
these internal prices to reduce its tax liability. But it is useful first to consider a benchmark 
price. A natural benchmark arises if we treat the multinational as having four independent 
plants, two in each country, each of which takes prices as given. In each case plant A uses k 
to produce x and plant B uses x to produce the final good c. Consider the case where there 
are no exports, in which case the profits of the two home country plants are    (  
 ){  (   )   } and    (   ){   (  )     }. Plant A chooses k to maximize its profit 
and plant B chooses      (   ) to maximize its profit. What value of q would yield the 
same outputs as in the case where these two plants were combined, i.e., the value of    ̂ 
for which    
 (  )  (  ̂  )   ? The answer is       (   ), the marginal cost of 
producing x. That is, if the transfer price is set equal to the marginal cost of plant A, then 
outputs would not be affected by splitting the home plant into two parts. The same applies 
to the case in which the intermediate good is exported, and holds even in the presence of 
the two cash flow taxes analyzed here, so                           (       ).  
We discuss below the possibility that the multinational can exploit the absence of an 
arms’ length price to manipulate its transfer prices in order to shift profit between the two 
countries. But while we allow the firm considerable latitude in its choice of transfer prices 
q       , we assume that it cannot choose different values for the two, for example 
exporting at a high price from the low-tax country and then exporting back from the high-
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tax country at a low price. This means that, even in the absence of transportation costs, the 
firm can gain no benefit from cross-hauling.   
With q    in expression (2.43), there are four possible regimes: 
Case A:      and e  (   )       
   (     )    and      
Case B:     and     (     )    
      (   )    and    
  
Case C:      and e  (   )       
   (     )    and      
Case D:     and     (     )    
      (   )    and    
  
In the first two cases, the high-tax country is importing, so the firm will wish to maximize q. 
In the last two cases, the high-tax country is exporting, and the firm will wish to minimize q. 
 In all four of these cases,          (   ). Making this substitution in (2.43) 
generates general first order conditions as follows: 
(2.44)   : (   )(   
   )  (    )(  
      )    
(2.45)      
     
 
  
  
(2.46)      
    (     
 )(    )  (     )(   
 )    
(2.47)       
    (     
 )(    )     (   
 )    
 With marginal cost pricing,   
 
  
  
 
  
, these conditions simplify to: 
(2.44’)     
  
 
  
, 
(2.45’)    
     
 
  
  
(2.46’)       
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(2.47’)    (   )    
 (    ) 
In this case, there is no distortion to the allocation of capital, but there is to the allocation of 
managerial skill.   
 More generally, consider first Case A, with     , where the home plant is 
exporting, and where the firm wishes to maximize q. From the k condition   
 
  
 implies 
that      
 . That is, with transfer pricing manipulation, production is shifted from the 
foreign country to the home country, reducing    and increasing   
 , increasing exports 
from the home country. Relative to the marginal cost pricing case, in this case   
 
  
 would 
also increase   
      , also pushing more intellectual property to the home country. By 
symmetry, the same result, that exports from the low-tax country increase, will hold for 
Case B. Now consider Case C, with     , where again the home firm is exporting, but now 
the firm wishes to minimize q. From the k condition   
 
  
 again implies that      
 . That 
is, with transfer pricing manipulation, production is again shifted from the foreign country 
to the home country, reducing    and increasing   
 , increasing exports from the home 
country. Relative to the marginal cost pricing case, in this case   
 
  
 would reduce 
     
   , again pushing more intellectual property to the home country. By symmetry, 
the same result, that exports from the high-tax country increase, will hold for Case D.   
 Thus, we have the interesting result that, regardless of whether the high-tax or low-
tax country exports, the ability to manipulate transfer prices makes export activity more 
attractive and causes the firm to adjust the location of production accordingly. Thus, the 
ability of the firm to manipulate transfer prices does not necessarily lead the firm to shift 
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production to the low-tax country, unless it also leads the firm to export from the low-tax 
country in the absence of transfer pricing manipulation. Certainly, by expression (2.47’), 
the firm already will have the tendency to locate intellectual property in the low-tax 
country, making that country more likely to export. On the other hand, the low-tax country 
might also have a stronger demand for good 1, increasing the likelihood that it would 
import. 
 For Cases A and B, where the firm would like to maximize q, in the extreme where 
the firm can raise q arbitrarily, a profit constraint that binds the choice of q. That is, the 
firm raises q to the point at which there are zero profits in the importing, high-tax country. 
This assumption alters the first-order conditions, because it makes q endogenous with 
respect to production decisions. In fact, things become very simple, because all profits now 
appear in the low-tax country. For example, for Case A, in which      and    , profits 
are: 
    (   ( (   )   )   )  (  
  ( (       )   )  (   )) (   ). 
This leads to first-order conditions: 
(2.44A)       
    
     
(2.45A)     
     
 
  
  
(2.46A)  : (   
     )  (  
      
   )    
(2.47A)         
  
That is, all tax distortions disappear, since all profits are effectively taxed at the low-tax 
country’s tax rate. Comparing this for the more general case discussed above, an initial rise 
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in q above 
 
  
 shifts production to the exporting country and drives an increasing wedge 
between    and   
 . However, eventually as a smaller and smaller share of profit is taxed in 
the high tax country, the wedge falls, until it reaches zero where all profit is taxed in the 
low tax country. 
 For Cases C and D, an obvious natural lower bound for q is q = 0. Whether this is 
feasible depends not only on the respective governments’ enforcement and information, 
but also on whether setting q this low drives profits below zero in the exporting country. If 
we assume not, i.e., that the constraint that the exporting country’s profits are non-negative 
is not binding at q = 0, then the first-order conditions imply that: 
(2.44C)     
  
 
  
 
(2.45C)   
     
 
  
  
(2.46C) 
  
   
 
  
 
    
  
(2.47C)      
   
Condition (2.46C) indicates that the country with the lower tax rate, which is the importing 
country, has a higher marginal product of capital. The shift of capital to the exporting 
country occurs because it gives the firm an opportunity to export more and shift more 
profits to the low-tax importing country. Condition (2.47C) indicates that the marginal 
product of intellectual capital is no longer lower in the low-tax country; so much 
intellectual capital is shifted to the exporting country that the initial bias in the location of 
intellectual capital disappears. 
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 Because of the complexity of the analysis for source-based taxation, in particular the 
four cases and the need to specify how transfer prices might be manipulated, we will not, at 
this point, analyze the choice of government spending. However, the nature of the 
distortions present, which we have seen influence the choice of government spending, will 
be discussed in the next session. 
3. Would Countries Choose to Deviate from a Source-Based Tax?  
  Since source-based taxes are a standard form of taxation, it is worth asking whether 
an individual country would have an incentive to move to a different tax base, starting from 
an equilibrium in which each country relies only on a source-based tax. 
 Because of the complexity of the question, we begin by assuming in analyzing it that 
the two countries have the same utility functions, so that there will be a symmetric 
equilibrium under the initial source-based tax, with the same initial tax rate and no net 
exports.10 We then go on to consider the more complex case without symmetry.  
 We also assume a Nash equilibrium, that is, that each country chooses its tax policy 
assuming that the policy of the other country is fixed. In this environment, we ask whether 
the home country would wish to deviate from the equilibrium by introducing either a small 
destination-based tax cash-flow tax or a small sales tax on good 1, which we showed to 
have similar effects to a cash-flow tax with formula apportionment. By the envelope 
theorem, we can ignore the benefits of changes in the level of government spending, 
assuming that the government always sets spending at its optimal level. Thus, we consider 
                                                 
10
 When symmetric equilibria exist we limit our attention to these and do not consider other possible equilibria. 
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in each case the substitution of the new tax for the old, keeping the level of public goods 
fixed.  
3.1. Would the home country adopt a destination-based cash-flow tax? 
3.1.1. Symmetric case 
 Suppose that we start with a symmetric equilibrium in which both countries have 
equal source-based taxes, levied at rates      and no other taxes. So that we do not have 
to keep track of associated prices changes, we assume for simplicity that the destination-
based tax is implemented in its equivalent form of a lump-sum tax, at rate z, on the home 
country’s share of profits. Let  be the experiment. Then the change in welfare with respect 
to  equals      , since government spending g is unchanged and hence       = 0.   To 
keep revenue the same, the changes in s and z must satisfy: 
(3.1)  
  
  ⁄
  
  ⁄
 
  
  ⁄
  
  ⁄
, 
from which it follows that         if and only if  
(3.2)   
  
  ⁄
  
  ⁄
 
  
  ⁄
  
  ⁄
   
 From (2.28), the effects of a change in the tax rate on real income are: 
(3.3)   
  
  
 
 
 
  
  
   
   
  
  ; and   
  
  
 
 
 
  
  
   
   
  
  
In this case,     
 (  ) and at the symmetric equilibrium  
(3.4)    (   ){(      )(   )  (  
   
    )(    )},  
We evaluate this at    . 
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 Since an increase in z is a lump-sum tax, its only behavioral impact will be to reduce 
g and   ; prices, consumption of good 1 and capital are all unaffected. As a result,  
(3.5)  
  
  
  
 
 
  
  
  
   
This is true for any of the regimes for the source-based tax, and so condition (3.2) therefore 
reduces to     ⁄  
  
  ⁄   ; that is, the increase in real income from reducing the 
source-based tax is larger than the decline in revenue.  
 With respect to the effects of a change in the source-based tax, the effect on real 
income is : 
(3.6) 
  
  
 
 
 
  
  
   
   
  
 
 
 
{ (      )  (   )  
   
  
 (    )  
    
 
  
}    
   
  
 , 
where other terms in       are zero by the envelope theorem.  
 Total tax levied is  
 (3.7)     
 
 
  (        
      ) 
Before differentiating this expression with respect to s, we must consider which of the four 
regimes applies, since even though e and e* will be zero in the initial symmetric 
equilibrium, this will not be the case once s and z change. By expression (2.47’), the 
reduction in s would shift production to the home country, absent any adjustment in q. And, 
as noted above, manipulating transfer pricing will only serve to increase exports from the 
home country. Given that a reduction in s implies that      and that the home country 
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will export, this implies that case A must hold, i.e., that      and e  (   )    .11 In this 
case, 
(3.8)      (             (   ))  
and so, (using     (  ) and 
  
  
   
  
  
   
  
  
 ): 
 
(3.9)  
  
  
              (   ) 
                                     (  
   
  
 (   
   )
   
  
 (     )
  
  
    
  
  
 ( (   )    )
  
  
) 
 
In the initial symmetric equilibrium,  (   )    . Also, because in this equilibrium the 
firm wishes neither to overstate nor understate its transfer price, we may assume that 
      . Hence, (by (2.44’),    
   . With these taken into account, (3.9) becomes: 
(3.9’)  
  
  
         (  
   
  
 
  
  
  
  
) 
 
 Combining (3.6) with (3.9’) generates the following condition for an increase in 
welfare under a switch to the destination-based tax, i.e.:      ⁄  
  
  ⁄   : 
 (3.10)    (
  
  
  
  
)  
      
 
 
(   )  
 
(
   
 
  
 
   
  
)  
We can solve for (
   
 
  
 
   
  
) from equations (2.44)-(2.47) using comparative statics, again 
assuming that we start at a symmetric equilibrium with marginal cost transfer pricing. 
From these four equations, we obtain: 
                                                 
11
 We show below that the pattern of production and consumption is consistent with this assumption. 
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(3.11)  
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(3.12)  
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(3.13)  
 (   
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(3.14)  
   
  
 
   
 
  
 
  
(   )
 
where the right-hand side of the last expression uses the fact that   
     
 
  
  from (2.45). 
Combining the first three of these expressions implies that 
(3.15)  
   
  
 
   
 
  
    
That is, starting from marginal-cost transfer pricing, there is no distortion of capital 
allocation because of the cash-flow tax base, even under source-based taxation. From 
(3.11), we have: 
(3.16)  
   
 
  
 
   
  
  
   
  
  (
   
 
  
 
   
  
) 
However, given that marginal utility equals the price in each country, it also is the case that 
(3.17)  
   
 
  
 
   
  
       (
   
 
  
 
   
  
) 
Since  
   
  
     and  
      , these two equations can hold simultaneously only if 
(
   
 
  
 
   
  
)   . Hence, 
   
 
  
 
   
  
   and expression (3.10) becomes 
(3.10’)    (
  
  
  
  
)  
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The left-hand side of this expression, which will be positive, represents the increased 
revenue generated from attracting managerial capital by reducing the source-based tax.  
This term reflects the efficiency gain from reducing the tax on a mobile factor. The right-
hand side of the expression, equals the net tax exporting that is given up by switching to 
the destination-based tax. We do not have a definitive result about whether the inequality 
holds, although, ceteris paribus, a higher initial value of s would make the result more likely. 
 Note that, even though relative consumption doesn’t change, production does shift. 
Combining (3.14) and (3.15), we obtain: 
(3.18)  
   
  
 
  
  
  
   
 
  
(   )
    
(3.19)  
   
  
 
  
  
 
   
 
  
(   )
    
where                   is the determinant of the Hessian of the production function.  
Since both m and k shift abroad with an increase in s, it is obvious that the first stage of 
production shifts abroad.  Put another way, as the home country lowers its source based 
tax, production shifts to the home country and the home country begins exporting, 
consistent with the assumption that Case A applies.  
3.1.2. Asymmetric case 
 Now consider the more general case without imposing symmetry. Then the transfer 
price would affect the tradeoff in (3.10). Begin with the general expression for profit, 
(3.20)   (   )(      )(   )  (  
   
    )(    )   ( (   )    )(   
 ) 
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evaluated at z = 0. We now have  
(3.21) 
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         ( (   )    )   ( (   )    )
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}    
   
  
 
 
while       is the same as in (3.9). Combining, these expressions, rearranging and using 
   
       (from (2.45)12), we can write the condition for welfare improvement as:  
(3.22)    (
  
  
  
  
)  
      (   
 )  
 
 
 
 
[(    )  
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      (      ) {
 ( (  )   )
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The first line of this expression is similar to that in (3.10). Compared to (3.10), the first 
term on the right-hand side is adjusted simply to reflect the fact that profits based on 
domestic production must now incorporate the difference between domestic consumption 
and domestic production. The only other difference in the first line is that we do not use the 
assumption of symmetry in combining the effects on the two output prices (and cannot 
generally show that these two price changes are equal). However, the interpretation of this 
line is similar to that above.  
 The introduction of asymmetry also introduces the second line. There are two new 
terms, both relating to the transfer prices associated with exports, and both reflecting the 
change in home country tax revenue. The first element reflects the effect on net exports 
from the home country of a change in s; this term is zero with marginal cost pricing. The 
second term reflects effect of the tax on net profits, and is thus divided by 2, since half of 
                                                 
12
 While this expression refers to the foreign country, the symmetry of the analysis implies that it holds for the home 
country as well. 
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the profit accrues to non-residents. This term reflects the effect of a change in tax on the 
value of exports through a change in the transfer price, again in response to a change in s. 
To interpret the impact of these new terms in this expression, it is useful to distinguish the 
effects of asymmetry per se and the separate effects of the deviations from marginal cost 
transfer pricing that arise as a result of cross-border trade and differences in tax rates. 
 In an asymmetric equilibrium with marginal cost pricing, expressions (3.11)-(3.13) 
still hold (although (3.14) is different because s and s* need not be equal). Thus, it will still 
be the case that 
   
 
  
 
   
  
  , so the second term on the right-hand side of (3.22) reduces 
to 
 
 
 (    )  
  (   )   
   
  
. The third term on the right-hand side vanishes with 
marginal cost pricing, since       . The final term equals 
( (  )   )
 
 
  
  
 (where q changes 
with s only because of a change in f1).  So, we may rewrite (3.22) as 
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Compared to (3.10’), the first term on the right-hand side is adjusted simply to reflect the 
presence of exports. The second and third terms, which each equal zero starting in a 
symmetric equilibrium, no longer do so here, even though it is still the case that 
   
 
  
 
   
  
. 
These two terms pick up further effects on after-tax profits occurring indirectly through 
price changes. 
 The net effect of these terms relating to changes in p1 and q will generally be 
indeterminate. For example, consider the case in which preferences are the same in the two 
countries, so that equal prices for good 1 translate into equal consumption of good 1 and 
the term in square brackets simplifies to  (    )  . In this case (with equal preferences), 
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the exporting country will be that with a lower tax rate. Thus, (    ) and (    ) will be 
of the opposite sign. Assuming that prices move in the same direction (i.e., an increase in 
input prices induces an increase in output prices), the second and third terms on the right-
hand side of (3.22’) will have the opposite sign regardless of which country starts with a 
lower tax rate. 
 For the more general case with transfer-pricing manipulation expression (3.22) may 
be rewritten as: 
(3.22”)       (
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Compared to the case where marginal cost transfer pricing was assumed, we now have two 
new terms, in the second line. To assess the signs of these, we have to consider the effects 
on the volume of exports and the transfer price separately the four cases described above. 
In general, a rise in s has both direct and indirect effects on the volume of exports and the 
transfer price. 
 Case A. Here     , the firm is exporting from the home country so that 
 (   )     and the firm is consequently maximizing the transfer price, so that       . 
Given a transfer price, the reduction in the tax rate differential would have a direct impact 
on the incentive to export, leading to a reduction in exports over and above the reduction 
we would expect to arise even with marginal cost pricing due to the higher domestic tax 
rate. And given the volume of exports, the reduction in the tax rate differential would also 
directly reduce the incentive to overstate the transfer price, so that q would fall relative to 
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    . In addition to these direct effects would be interactions: a lower volume of exports 
would reduce the gains from manipulating the transfer price, which would tend to reduce q 
still further. And the direct effect on the transfer price would reduce the benefit of 
exporting, which would tend to reduce exports still further. 
 Combined, therefore, these effects reinforce each other, so that both the volume of 
exports, and the transfer price, fall. As a consequence both the new terms should be 
negative, increasing the chance of the reform being undertaken. Lowering the source-based 
tax would increase the benefits derived by the low-tax home country from transfer-pricing 
manipulation. 
 Case B. In this case the home country is the net importer, so that  (   )    ; 
    , and the firm is consequently maximizing the transfer price, so that, again,       . 
A rise in s would increase the tax rate differential. An increase in the differential would 
have the direct effect of inducing more production to take place abroad (both because of 
the incentive to shift production abroad due to a higher tax at home and the greater payoff 
to trade-based transfer pricing manipulation), raising imports. It would also probably have 
a direct effect by raising the transfer price further. These two effects are again self-
reinforcing. The higher volume of imports would induce a further rise in the transfer price, 
and the rise in transfer price would further increase imports. These effects again imply that 
both terms are unambiguously negative, making the condition more likely to hold. Here, 
lowering the source-based tax limits the damage that the high-tax home country suffers 
from transfer-pricing manipulation. 
 Case C. This is a case where the firm is exporting from the home country, so that 
 (   )    . But, unlike in Case A,    
 , and the firm is consequently minimizing the 
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transfer price, so that       . A rise in s would now increase the tax rate differential 
between the two countries. For a given transfer price, a rise in the tax differential would 
have an ambiguous direct effect on exports from the home country, since the transfer-
pricing gain from exporting is increased, but the increase in domestic production costs 
discourages domestic production and exports. Conditional on the volume of exports, a rise 
in s would also probably directly induce a reduction in the transfer price, to take advantage 
of the increased tax differential. As to interaction effects, the direct reduction in the 
transfer price would increase the value of exports, and so would lead indirectly to higher 
exports, but the direction of the effect of exports on the transfer price is uncertain because 
of the uncertain direct impact on exports. The net effects on both the volume of exports and 
the transfer price are therefore ambiguous. Neither of the additional terms can therefore be 
signed.  
 Case D. The home country is the net importer, so that  (   )    . Now    
 , and 
the firm is consequently minimizing the transfer price, so that       . As with case C, the 
effects on the volume of imports and the transfer price of a rise in s are ambiguous. The 
direct effect of a reduction in the tax rate differential would be to reduce imports because 
of a lower transfer-pricing benefit of trade, but to increase imports because of higher home 
production costs. Thus, the direct effect on imports is ambiguous, for the same reason given 
in Case C. Also, the direct effect of the smaller tax rate differential would be to raise the 
transfer price, and this would have the indirect effect of encouraging more imports. But, as 
in Case C, the first term is still of ambiguous sign, and hence so is its indirect effect on the 
second term. Hence, both terms are of ambiguous sign, as in Case C.  
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 In sum, transfer pricing manipulation increases the incentive to move away from the 
source-based tax in Cases A and B. We might consider these the “normal” cases, where the 
lower-tax country is exporting. The reasoning is different in the two cases, though, with the 
low-tax country in Case A lowering its tax rate to benefit more from the multinational’s 
transfer pricing manipulation, and the high-tax country in Case B lowering its rate to 
reduce the damage that it suffers from transfer pricing manipulation. In the other two 
cases, though, the picture is less clear, because the high-tax country is also the exporting 
country. These cases would arise only where the high-tax country also has a stronger 
demand for the good produced by the multinational, given that the initial move away from 
a symmetric equilibrium leads the higher-tax country to import. 
3.2. Would the home country adopt a sales tax on good 1? 
 Suppose now that we start with a symmetric equilibrium in which both countries 
have equal source-based taxes (    ) and the home country considers introducing a sales 
tax on good 1 at rate t, as an equal-yield replacement for s. As in the previous case, welfare 
will increase if and only if 
(3.23)  
  
  ⁄
  
  ⁄
 
  
  ⁄
  
  ⁄
 . 
 Because we are starting from the same equilibrium, the changes in Y and T with 
respect to s are the same as in (3.6) with (3.9’), and the discussion relating to these 
expressions holds as well. Now, consider the corresponding terms for t. Since 
(3.24)     (   )((   )      )  (   
 )((    )  
   
    )   (    )(    ), 
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the effect of a change in t on real income, starting at t = 0 in the symmetric equilibrium, is 
therefore (following the same approach as in (2.29)): 
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Now consider the changes in T. We again may assume that case A holds, and so we have: 
(3.26)             ((   )             (   )) 
Therefore, following the logic used in deriving (3.9’), we obtain 
(3.27)    
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where the last equality comes from the fact that the sales tax does not distort the location 
of intangible assets, as discussed above. We therefore may express condition (3.23) as: 
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Using the fact that we are initially in a symmetric equilibrium and 
   
  
 
   
 
  
, this further 
simplifies to: 
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Note, from expression (2.24), that 
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Consider first the special case where there are no consumption rents, so that    is constant 
and equal across the two countries. Then this expression becomes: 
     
   
  
 
   
 
  
 
and (3.23”) becomes:  
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The left-hand side of (3.23’”) equals 1 because dY/dt = -dT/dt in this case – there is neither 
a production distortion nor tax exporting. This expression is satisfied if 
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which is the same expression as (3.10’); when there is no tax exporting under the sales tax, 
the decision is the same as under the destination-based tax.13 However, if there are 
consumption rents, then  
     
   
  
 
   
 
  
 
since some of the sales tax wedge will show up in a reduced producer price. This reduces in 
absolute value the numerator of the left-hand side of (3.23”), making it more likely that the 
condition will be met (since the overall term is negative); with consumption rents, some of 
                                                 
13
 One might have expected the condition to differ from (3.10’) even in this special case, since the sales tax 
introduces a consumption distortion that is not present under the destination-based tax. However, our experiment 
here considers the introduction of a small sales tax, starting from an initial value of zero, for which there is no first-
order deadweight loss. For a larger tax change, the adoption of a sales tax would presumably be less attractive 
because of the associated consumption distortion, although the analysis would also be more complicated.   
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the burden of the sales tax is shifted onto producers, and some of this burden on producers 
is borne by owners in the other country. 
4. Local ownership of fixed factors 
We now modify the model, assuming that the rents to the fixed factors accrue to 
domestic residents instead of to the multinational. There are two fixed factors implicit in 
the two production functions  (   ) and  (  ). Assuming these factors are owned by 
domestic residents is equivalent, in our model where there is a representative consumer in 
each country, to modifying our assumption about the sharing of profits to one where 
domestic profits attributable to these two factors are received by domestic residents. 
 With this modification, consider again the issue of whether the home country will 
wish to shift from a source-based tax to a destination-based tax, starting again from the 
assumption that the initial equilibrium is symmetric. In place of equation (3.4), the 
definition of overall profits, we now have profits of domestic residents, say  ̂: 
(3.4’)  ̂  (   ) ((   ) {(            
 )  
   
    
 
}  (    )
  
   
 
  
 (   )
 
) 
where the terms divided by 2 represent the domestic and foreign components of the 
multinational’s remaining profits, from managerial capital.14 
 Based on (3.4’), the change in domestic income with respect to s is now (as we are 
assumed to be in Regime A): 
                                                 
14
 Note that the domestic term is subtracted to account for the fact that only half of this component of domestic 
earnings goes to the domestic resident. 
 42 
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Given marginal cost transfer pricing,   
          ⁄ , and from (3.14), we have:   
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and the last line in expression (3.6’) becomes: 
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Substituting this into (3.6’) and adding the resulting expression for     ⁄  to     ⁄  as 
defined in (3.9’) yields the following condition in place of (3.10): 
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One may interpret the right-hand side of (3.10”) as the change in “pure” profits resulting 
from the shift in domestic production spurred by the change in s, with the marginal cost of 
managerial skill taken into account. This will be zero for the optimizing firm, as we see by 
expanding this term: 
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where the last equality follows from the assumption of marginal cost transfer pricing.  
Thus, expression (3.10”) reduces to the simple inequality condition,  
(4.3)    (
  
  
  
  
)    
Compared to expression (3.10’), there is no positive term on the right-hand side, because 
there is no tax exporting when domestic rents are owned by domestic factors. Thus, the 
home country will not wish to distort production. 
5. Conclusions 
 This paper models the effects of alternative forms of consumption-type taxes in a two-
country model with trade of semi-finished goods and mobile factors of production.  
 In our base case, we consider a representative multinational that produces and sells in 
each of the two countries and allocates capital and managerial skill between the two countries for 
production. There are three sources of rents for the multinational: a fixed factor in each country 
of basic production; managerial skill, owned by the company, and mobile between the two 
countries; and a fixed factor in the country of consumption, associated with preparing the semi-
finished good for the local market. We consider three main forms of cash-flow taxation, all of 
which would be equivalent in a closed economy: a cash-flow tax levied on the multinational on a 
source basis, the equivalent tax levied on a destination basis, and one whose base is allocated 
using sales-only formula apportionment (the effects of which can be studied by analyzing a sales 
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tax levied on the good produced by the multinational.) We describe the forms of distortion to 
production and consumption generated by these taxes.  
 We investigate whether there is an incentive for a national government to move away 
from an equilibrium in which both countries use only the source-based tax. We show that the 
government faces a trade-off. One the one hand, movement away from a source-based tax to a 
destination-based tax reduces distortions and improves welfare. This result may be reinforced by 
the presence of transfer-pricing manipulation by firms, either by pushing a high-tax country to 
lower its tax to reduce the incentives for such manipulation (from which it suffers), or by leading 
a low-tax country to lower its tax still further to encourage an expansion of such manipulation 
(from which it benefits). On the other hand, the source-based tax is partially incident on the 
owners of the multinational; since some of them may be non-residents, the tax can improve the 
welfare of domestic residents, if its distortions are small relative to this shifting. For a shift to the 
sales-apportioned tax, the calculus is somewhat more complicated, as the apportioned tax may 
also partially be shifted to non-residents, but also introduces various distortions (not all of which 
are incorporated in our analysis) absent under the destination-based tax.  
 However, the potential attractiveness of the source-based tax evaporates if the returns to 
fixed production factors in each country are captured by domestic residents, so that the rent of 
the multinational is due solely to its ownership of managerial skill. In this case, the source-based 
tax is incident only on domestic residents, and so its main potential benefit for the national 
government is no longer present. This tax does, however, continue to distort the choice of where 
to locate mobile managerial skill. This distortion reduces welfare, and can be reduced by a 
substitution away from the source-based tax in the direction of the destination-based tax, or a 
sales (or sales-apportioned) tax.    
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